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
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
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM	
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
	A130364		
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED	
Peacekeeping: A New Role for US Forces		Individual Essay	
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
7. AUTHOR(s)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)	
LTC Alfred W. Baker			
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013			
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE	
Same as 9		1 April 1983	
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES	
		24	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)	
		UNCLAS	
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)			
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
<p>This essay examines the nature and scope of peacekeeping operations, defines peacekeeping as applied today and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of direct participation in peacekeeping operations by the United States. The essay examines the United States' participation in the multinational force peacekeeping in the Sinai and in Beirut and then concludes by making recommendations on how United States' participation in peacekeeping operations could be improved in general and in Beirut specifically.</p>			

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PEACEKEEPING: A NEW ROLE FOR U. S. FORCES



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Class of 1983

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"Peacekeeping is to war-making what acting is to ballet - the environment is similar but the techniques are very different."

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Given the extant political conditions, the United States had no real alternative except to establish the two peacekeeping missions for which it now provides forces. The Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was created as a result of a standing commitment to the Camp David Accords.² The United States had promised to furnish peacekeeping forces should the United Nations fail to do so.



The second commitment was, and remains, more controversial. In their search for a method of stopping the Israeli destruction of Beirut, United States' negotiators offered American forces to supervise the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from that particular area of Lebanon. Although the United States Marines, who were sent to accomplish the mission, were quickly withdrawn as soon as the evacuation was complete, they were as quickly returned, following the massacres in Sabra and Shatilla Refugee Camps.

Thus, the United States Armed Forces gained two new

missions - missions for which little or no official doctrine existed, and missions which continue to remain explosively dangerous, both in terms of the number of forces involved, and in terms of their potential for escalation into a major conflict.

This paper will examine the nature and scope of peacekeeping operations, define peacekeeping in current terms, and discuss the pros and cons of the United States' direct participation in peacekeeping operations.

The Nature and Scope of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping, unfamiliar as it is in U. S. doctrine, is not a new concept. It remains a dynamic concept, however, and one that has changed dramatically over the years.³ The title "Peacekeeping" has been applied, and misapplied, to several types of missions, but it has generally been employed in describing missions which have been assigned to forces from multinational organizations, where the objective has been to bring about a cessation of violence. Those missions can be broken down into four distinct types: observer missions, emergency force missions, security force missions, and intervention force missions. Some may argue that the United States forward-deployed forces also serve in a peacekeeping role, inasmuch as they deter war. While I

will not disclaim their contribution to world peace, I will exclude them from consideration here, in view of the fact that they will not fit the definition of peacekeeping forces which shall be established in more detail later.

Observer missions are fact-finding in nature, and are still used by the United Nations, and other multinational organizations, in their attempt to limit conflict or to deter violence. Observers are an extension of the political elements that are working to instill peace in the area. It is to the political negotiators that the observers report their facts, generally military in nature. Examples would be: border violations, cease-fire violations, or any breach of a truce agreement. Observers are generally qualified field-grade military officers, who work unarmed and unprotected in areas of conflict. Military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), for example, are active in Lebanon, as well as other troubled areas in the Middle East, and they liaise with the multinational forces in Beirut. It is interesting to note that UNTSO is the only United Nations peacekeeping effort in the Middle East which allows both United States' and Soviet officers to be assigned to it. Areas where officers from these two nations can serve are limited, but they do serve together in Syria and Egypt. United Nations forces that bear arms have excluded both superpowers, for fear that a confrontation could escalate a situation rather than defuse

it.

Emergency force missions are designed to prevent the outbreak of, or spread of, international conflicts by filling power vacuums with a neutral presence. This is the prevalent type of peacekeeping mission that has evolved out of all those tried by the United Nations, and it is the one which the generic term "peacekeeping force" has come to epitomize. Examples of emergency force missions include: the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and both of the peacekeeping missions upon which the U. S. has embarked in the Middle East. These forces are lightly armed, but their weapons are generally used only in self-defense. They generally have limited powers of detention, and they must rely on established local authority for their powers of arrest, or even for long term detention. Because this is the mission with which the U. S. is basically concerned, the nuances of this mission will be discussed in detail later.

Security force missions are those peacekeeping missions which have the job of setting up control of a country or territory until it can be handed over to a sovereign authority. There is a nebulous distinction between this type of mission and an emergency force mission. The general test is whether or not there is a government functioning in the area, as well as the amount of authority mandated to the peacekeeping force. The United Nations Temporary Executive

Authority (UNTEA) which, with its military arm, the United Nations Security Force (UNSF), maintained local security and fully administered West New Guinea until Indonesia took over in May, 1963, is an example of a security force mission.⁴

The fourth type of peacekeeping operation that has been evoked has the ultimate authority. Called intervention force missions, the peacekeepers are utilized when the sponsoring multinational organization is willing to use force to impose peace in an area where conflict has erupted. The United Nations intervention in the Congo beginning in June, 1960 was granted authority by the United Nations Security Council to use force in order to perform its functions.⁵ Since this type of operation takes on a limited warfare role, a role for which our own forces are prepared, it is not necessary to define this type of mission in more detail.

Defining Peacekeeping

What is a peacekeeping mission then? While I have alluded to a definition, the United States does not define it precisely. In fact, United States military doctrine makes scant reference to it. FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, lists peacekeeping under "other operations," but simply states: "The United States may be called upon to

provide support to a UN or treaty organization force that responds to a government seeking assistance to restore order or that intervenes in a country which no longer has an effective government."⁶ While that definition can be accurate for some peacekeeping operations, it does not fit the situation that the U. S. faces in the Middle East.

Peacekeeping is, likewise, not defined in the United Nations' Charter. Rather, it is implied, and it is derived from the basic premise of the United Nations: the maintenance of peace and security. Whenever power vacuums arose, the United Nations began to attempt various means of filling the existing voids in order to preserve peace.⁷ The observer groups which were established in the Middle East and in Kashmir in 1948 were the first attempts at peacekeeping by the United Nations, and these groups became the forerunners of later and more sophisticated peacekeeping operations.⁸ By 1970, the United Nations had authorized twelve peacekeeping missions, and had tried all four of the techniques described earlier.⁹ Of the four, only two techniques remain: observer forces and emergency forces. And still no definition of peacekeeping exists within the framework of the United Nations.

Defining peacekeeping was left to the International Peace Academy during its study of the international control of violence. In 1970, the Academy concluded that the role of peacekeeping operations is the "prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within

states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."¹⁰

Two words in this definition require some discussion: "peaceful" and "third-party." "Peaceful" connotes that there will be no enforcement of peace by military means, and "third-party" implies that the forces used to fill the power vacuum will be emotionally detached from the arguments of the belligerents. "Third-party" also implies that the forces used can remain objective and nonaligned with any party to the dispute.

The role that our forces have been given in the Sinai and in Beirut has been guided by the Academy's definition of peacekeeping. Our forces operate in both areas without enforcement authority. They are armed, but only for self-protection. Their real weapons are only those of reasoning, persuasion, and diplomacy. This is an entirely new mission for our forces; one that is nearly the antithesis of the normally assigned combat role. The premise underlying this new type of mission is that violence can be controlled without resorting to violence. The technique is to remove or, at least, temper the causes of the conflict, so that the roots of the struggle wane rather than flourish. The utilization of military forces is merely a means of providing a stable and, ideally, a tension-free atmosphere

in which political elements can deal with the resolution of the problem.

This is a tough mission for a combat unit. Our forces do not train for this mission, nor do they have any handy reference material to which they can turn. On the contrary, our units were deployed, particularly into Beirut, on an ad hoc, improvised basis. The political necessity for this action was firmly established, but the question remains as to whether the consequence of a failed mission was given due consideration.

"What peacekeeping needs is not a permanent Army but a set of permanent concepts."¹¹

Countries that have contributed forces under the United Nations' banner have provided important lessons for our own use. Like most important lessons, they have been learned the hard way. Most of the countries which presently deploy forces to United Nations peacekeeping efforts have recognized the dichotomy of skills needed for peacekeeping as opposed to those needed for making war. For this reason, these countries now utilize units which have been specially trained, organized, and equipped, in place of regularly deployable units.

The differences between combatants and peacekeepers are numerous. Combat units should be aggressive. Peacekeepers need to be assertive but not aggressive. Combatants should be innovative and should act vigorously in the absence of

orders. In peacekeeping, a controlled response is usually called for, and centralized direction is essential. The law of precedents applies. If a peacekeeping element disregards any rule of impartiality, it can forfeit the confidence, respect, and trust of the parties involved in the conflict, and it can cause the loss of cooperation, understanding, and recognition that are vital to mission accomplishment.

The differences continue. Combatants should work from simplified mission-type orders. Peacekeepers work from very complex rules of engagement, and the political objective is moved down to the individual soldier. There is no translation into a military mission as there would be for combat units. Training for combat centers around the destruction of enemy forces. Training for peacekeeping centers around diplomacy and mediation, suppressing unlawful assembly, and action in response to politically instigated or contrived situations. In peacekeeping, understanding the customs and mores of the area is more important than weapons training; avoiding needless confrontations with local inhabitants is a primary function of leadership.

Every soldier assigned peacekeeping duties ideally would be a linguist who is part politician, part diplomat, and a genuinely decent person who can be respected by all parties to the conflict and who is intellectually capable of understanding the issues without becoming emotionally

aligned with one point of view. All peacekeepers should be fully qualified soldiers who are mature and disciplined. Apply this ideal standard against reality. The paradox of the complexities of the mission is best summed up by a United Nations soldier's lament: "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."¹²

Even the processes of inculcating an impartial attitude into a group of young servicemen seem difficult. We tend to train our forces in absolutes, in go or no-go, right or wrong. In peacekeeping, every soldier must understand that two conflicting ideas may both be right. The role of impartiality cannot be overemphasized. There is no "enemy force." If one should ever develop, the peacekeeper will have no possibility of successfully carrying out his mandate, and the likelihood of the peacekeeping forces being drawn into the conflict are heightened.

These stringent requirements, varied as they are from normal soldierly duties, have compelled most of the nations which furnish forces to United Nations missions to constitute forces for that purpose only. Officers are selected for their ability to understand broad issues and for their competency in translating and articulating those issues to soldiers effectively. Specially constructed peacekeeping battalions usually have additional officers assigned to it - more than twice as many as are assigned regularly to light infantry battalions. Overall, the

the battalion is pared down in strength, but extra mobility is added in order that the soldiers can be moved rapidly. Patrol dogs, guard dogs, and radar were particularly effective tools in southern Lebanon. Communications, essential to centralized control, are reinforced and are made redundant. Officers and men are often recycled to peacekeeping duties repeatedly. Some countries recruit their enlisted men for peacekeeping duty only, train them, and then discharge them after they have served their tour. Other countries simply reorganized and retrained their present units.

The United States has copied, to some degree, United Nations force patterns in the Sinai. The Multinational Force is headed by a Norwegian General who has command authority over the United States contingent. This detaches the force directly from the United States Government, a key principle which will be discussed in detail later.

Special equipment to aid in mobility and communications has been predeployed for use by rotating units. A Department of Army circular has been promulgated outlining the program for U. S. Army units assigned to duty there.¹³ The "Terms of Reference for U. S. Military Participation in and Support to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)," however, specifically forbids the creation of "MFO only units" and directs that the forces which are to be used there be drawn from existing units. The Terms of Reference do

allow task organizing of existing units, to meet "specific operational requirements and/or political restrictions that exist or which may be imposed."¹⁴

The United States Marines operating in the much more volatile area of Beirut did not have the advantage of the long lead time planning that the MFO had. The situation in Beirut was a true emergency. United States Marines were sent ashore from the Marine Amphibious Unit afloat in the Mediterranean. The operation, dangerous and complex as it was, was envisioned as being only of long enough duration as it would take to insure the controlled evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut.

After the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla, our Marines were returned to Beirut along with forces from Italy and France. A longer term open-ended commitment evolved, but it evolved without long term planning. Again, it was the Marines from Naval forces in the Mediterranean that provided the peacekeeping forces, not because they were trained and ready for this type of mission, but because they were already there.

To indicate how extemporaneous the current peacekeeping force is operating in the area, consider this. Although the "Multinational Force" in Beirut has been in existence for seven months now, and although the force has expanded to include troops from the United Kingdom, I could find nothing to indicate that a combined headquarters has been established.

Each of the four national forces in this "combined" force appears to report to and receive orders directly through national channels. There appears to be nothing to direct the common effort. The commitment, open-ended as it continues to be, is tied to factors beyond the control of the United States. How long will it take to get Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian forces out of Lebanon, and how long will it be before the Lebanese Army is capable of controlling the country's 4,000 square miles? Several students of the situation in Lebanon have suggested privately that there will be another round of violence between Syria and Israel before a withdrawal can be achieved.

No matter how improvised the peacekeeping force sent to Beirut was, it has thus far been successful. The coercive power of the United States, along with the excellent performance of the Marines and the other forces, has had the desired effect. Much credit must be given to the Marines on the ground and to their officers. There are many pitfalls which must be avoided in this type of peacekeeping mission and, to date, the leaders have foreseen all the traps.

Art Harris interviewed returning Marines about their training and indoctrination, and he questioned them as to how they prepared to perform their mission. He concluded that they were well briefed. "Marines had orders to return fire only if being fired upon would put them in mortal danger."¹⁵ Marines patrolled with unloaded weapons; they

kept their ammunition in their pockets. Hours were spent by Marine officers indoctrinating their men on the rules of engagement and emphasizing restraint. No action was to be taken that could be construed as a provocation.¹⁶

This impromptu effort to instill the procedures of peacekeeping, procedures which have been learned in other peacekeeping missions, has been effective and has paid dividends to our forces. Although success is never absolute, the peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon have certainly helped hold the violence down to a minimum. Doing nothing wrong in peacekeeping is much more important than doing a lot right. A serious mistake can have far-reaching consequences and can involve the peacekeeping force in the conflict itself.

The Sinai MFO has also been successful. There, the challenge is not as great as the one in Beirut, simply because the area is not nearly as tense or fraught with explosive danger. That condition could change rapidly, but the possibility appears remote at this time. The MFO Sinai is a more permanent, fixed operation and it has had a long time to develop its procedures. There has not been a major conflict in the Sinai since 1973. Beirut, on the other hand, teems with unrest.

Peacekeeping forces cannot expect to prevent every attack, such as the one that took place on the American Embassy on 18 April 1983. Peacekeepers are limited in their

physical ability to control such terrorist acts and must rely on their impartiality to protect them from such acts of violence. Whereas their demonstrated neutrality is not an absolute guarantee of safety from acts of harm, lack of it will inevitably lead to violence against them.

While politically motivated attacks by radical elements cannot be eliminated completely, they can, however, be reduced by proper intelligence and security operations. Undue attention cannot be given to any radical elements. They are not the primary concern of the peacekeeper, and to make them primary would be to play into their hands. The moderate, rational, peace-loving people are the elements to which the peacekeeper must play. Keeping them from being led into violence should be his primary concern. By his understanding of the basic conflict, and by successfully convincing the population of his impartiality and his strength through non-violence, the peacekeeper can be truly effective. If the area is ever to be calmed, only this type of peacekeeping force can do it.

The risks of peacekeeping are potentially equal to or greater than the rewards. If a basic mistake is made, it can have catastrophic effects. Let's deal with a hypothetical situation: Suppose that the United States Marines, in their attempt to eliminate "terrorists" from Beirut, had begun operating with, or had given the appearance of operating with, Israeli forces. Every enemy of Israel would also

become enemies of the Marines and acts of terror against our forces would escalate rapidly. No longer would the United States be dealing with splinter, radical groups. They would then be dealing with large segments of the population. The United States would then be embroiled in a situation in which it could not win, led there by its own good intentions.

Pros and Cons of the United States' Direct Participation

The Middle East is a flashpoint. It is an area where minor skirmishes can quickly escalate and can easily involve the superpowers. This has been the cornerstone of a strong argument for keeping United States forces out of the area. The authors of such arguments believe that the United States would be better served by the establishment of a recognized international, multinational force, such as a United Nations force, because of its ability to be more detached from the conflict during the process of keeping the peace. This idea has been publicly espoused by such prominent people as Senator Barry Goldwater.

Public officials are not alone in voicing concern over United States direct involvement. Nor does this concern arise only in this country. As was pointed out earlier, the United Nations has excluded great power participation in their peacekeeping operations. This exclusion was based upon

the fear of an East-West confrontation which could have far-reaching and potentially catastrophic results. Those individuals who fear the flashpoint temperament of the Middle East direct attention to the fact that anything can happen there. They refer to the much publicized incident that took place during the first week of February 1983, wherein a United States Marine Captain confronted an Israeli Lieutenant Colonel with a loaded weapon, as a dramatic demonstration of just how volatile the situation is for our forces in that region. Suppose that altercation had involved factions that could not, for political reasons, back down; how quickly that situation could have escalated out of control.

If the threat of potential consequences of factions ignoring the orders of peacekeepers is not enough to cause concern, there is also the threat of planned violence directed against our forces to deliberately entrap them in a situation that could lead to a confrontation that we are not prepared to win. There is much at risk for the United States; too much, perhaps, for the possible benefits. Detractors of direct United States participation ask: "Are we inviting more trouble than we are willing to endure?"¹⁷

These fears have been fed by recent press reports of the likelihood of a renewed war between Syria and Israel.¹⁸ Whether or not a war between these two countries is encouraged by the Soviets is immaterial; any major conflict could involve

our forces. What happens under those circumstances? Do we come to the aid of our forces? The danger has further been expanded by the reported presence of Soviet forces in Syria and the Beqaa Valley area of Lebanon. Columnists Evans and Novak report more than 5,000 Soviet soldiers in the area, actively participating with Syrian military forces.¹⁹ Generally, the further that the great power forces operate away from each other, the less likely is the chance of an unintentional conflict developing.

What are the alternatives to our current course of actions? There are two separate, but perhaps overlapping, steps that the United States can take to extricate itself from the perils it currently faces, without reducing the effectiveness it has gained to date. The first is a political step; one that would disengage the United States Government from direct participation with its forces. The nuance of this step is an important issue - one that was not forgotten in the establishment of the Sinai MFO. As previously pointed out, a multinational headquarters has been established in the Sinai which has command of the U. S. Forces assigned to duty there. This puts a layer between our forces and our government, and it relieves our government of any direct responsibility for any mistakes that our forces might make.

The second step would be to disengage militarily. The current commitment could be quickly altered by the

employment of a reinforced United Nations force which would replace the multinational force that is in place. This would be the preferred course of action as opposed to the establishment of an ad hoc multinational force headquarters, because of the broad based political support that the United Nations has.

This plan would not eliminate the need for continual United States interest in the force's activities. On the contrary, any peacekeeping force would have no chance of success without the complete moral support of the United States political apparatus. This is particularly true in confrontations with the Israelis. United States Military Observers attached to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, operating in conjunction with the United Nations armed forces, could be the object of our focus. By maintaining the same level of interest, we could attain nearly the same degree of success that our forces have accomplished without the risks associated with direct involvement.

Chaim Herzog, the newly elected President of Israel, in arguing for the creation of a United States peacekeeping force in Lebanon, espoused the idea that United Nations forces were not adequate because the "Political realities in the Security Council assure that such a force will never be given the strong terms of reference needed to be effective." He attributes the "weakness" of the United Nations forces to

the lack of a strong mandate and credits the Soviets, the Arabs, and the Third World for seeing to that. He envisioned a major United States force with the necessary equipment and enough "credibility" to be acceptable to Israel.²⁰ Yet, by February 1983, seven months after Mr. Herzog's call, serious confrontations had taken place between United States Marine Peacekeepers and the Israeli Defense Forces.²¹

Objectives that Israel defines for the peacekeepers in Lebanon do not necessarily coincide with United States objectives. The nuances of peacekeeping are such that the force cannot ally itself with any party to the belligerency without becoming enmeshed in the hostilities themselves. The peacekeeper, by definition, cannot become an extension of Israeli aims. The confrontations that have existed between the two forces show Israeli frustration with, and a lack of understanding of, the role of our forces. We cannot become part of the belligerency and hope to be of any help in solving the problem between two of our friends.

If Mr. Herzog is correct, and the United Nations is either unwilling or unable to replace the existing peacekeeping force in Beirut to the satisfaction of the United States, then there are other measures that can be taken to reduce the risks. The first of these actions would be to establish a multinational headquarters structure to give centralized direction to the committed forces.

The headquarters would serve two additional functions. First, it would dictate that an agreement would be reached on the terms of reference for the forces operating under its command. It would cause those terms to be understood by all the forces and would centralize control so that unity of effort could be attained. The second function is more abstract, but is the more important. It would remove the United States and its allies from direct government to force relationship, and would insert a buffer between the assigned multinational forces and their respective governments. The reasons for this are the same as for using a multinational force headquarters in the Sinai or desiring to use the United Nations headquarters; it helps avoid escalations in time of conflict.

Concurrent with the establishment of the multinational headquarters, the United States Marines should be replaced with forces specially trained and equipped for peacekeeping. The requirements established earlier in this paper, modified by the experience of our forces in Lebanon, should be adhered to and the objectives should be agreed to by the multinational force headquarters. This would release the combat-ready Marines to be put back afloat, ready to meet any contingency missions that might arise in the area.

If the United States were to form peacekeeping battalions, they could be used in both of the missions wherein the United States provides forces for carrying out

a peacekeeping mandate. A division assigned this peacekeeping mission could orient its training for that primary mission, leaving its combat role as a secondary mission. There is a vast difference between the two roles, and one that we cannot afford to forget. Thus, United States attentiveness to this difference would help to refine the ability of our forces to perform this new mission, would prepare us for future peacekeeping requirements, and would advance the doctrine of peacekeeping dramatically. The United States would not only strengthen its own capability, but it would contribute to the strengthening of the United Nations' ability to maintain peace throughout the world. It would also provide doctrine for use in United States military assistance programs which are earmarked for training United Nations peacekeeping units.

"Some military experts have said it may take two years for the (Lebanese) Army to rebuild and even then there is concern whether it will be much more than a weak territorial force."²²

The signs point to a long commitment of our forces. If we are unable to quickly extract ourselves from this potential quagmire, let us at least adequately prepare our forces for this new mission.

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